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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4l 03(2)G) based on the transfer of this appeal from the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court err in concluding that the parties reached a

binding and enforceable contract when the written document executed at the
mediation expressly provided that it was subject to the drafting of a mutually
acceptable settlement agreement and a new agreement with a third party, and that
the litigation was not to be dismissed until the execution of such final agreements?
Standard of Review: "Generally, a trial court's summary enforcement of a

settlement agreement 'will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there
was an abuse of discretion."' John Deere Co. v. A & H Equip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880,
883 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Zions First Nat 'l Bank v. Barbara Jensen
Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478,479 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (additional internal citation
and quotation omitted)). Nonetheless, the question in arriving at the decision to
enforce a settlement agreement of whether there was a meeting of the minds or
whether a contract exists between parties is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. See id.; McKelvey v. Hamilton, 2009 UT App 126, <J[ 17, 211 P.3d 390
(in considering trial court's ruling on motion to enforce settlement agreement,
"[t]he existence of a contract is a question oflaw, to be reviewed for correctness").

1

Preservation Below: The Knights preserved this issue in briefing and oral

argument of Patterson's motion to enforce a settlement agreement [0362-70,

0648-55, 0678-80.] 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a dispute between plaintiff/appellee Charley Patterson ("Patterson")
and defendants/appellants Jed and Alisha Knight (the "Knights") regarding the
splitting of commissions received for the distribution of products of Nu-Skin
Enterprises, Inc. ("Nu-Skin"). [0001-16.] Patterson filed this action alleging
among other things that the Knights breached the joint venture agreement between
~

the parties. [0001-16.] The Knights denied Patterson's claims and asserted
various counterclaims. [0034-50.]
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

After exchanging pleadings, the parties stipulated to stay the case and
mediate their dispute. [0123-0141.] At the conclusion of a mediation, the parties
executed a hand-written document, [Add. A at 0551], (the "Mediation
Agreement") (attached as Addendum B) drafted by Patterson's counsel [0349].
Among other things, the Mediation Agreement called for a new agreement
to-be-negotiated with a third party known as Spearhead, under which Spearhead

1

Citations to the record below are indicated by page (e.g., "[ 100]"). Citations to
the "Relevant Facts" section of this brief are as follows: [Fact_].
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would cease paying solely Jed Knight, but instead split commissions from
Spearhead 50-50 between the Knights and Patterson. [Add. B at <JI I.]
Additionally, the Mediation Agreement was expressly subject to the drafting of a
mutually acceptable settlement agreement between the parties, to include express
terms of the Mediation Agreement and also a to-be-negotiated mutual nondisparagement clause; a new agreement for Got Your Number, Inc. ("GYN"), a
Florida company owned by the parties; and the new Spearhead agreement. [Add.
B at <JI 8.] The filing of papers to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice was expressly
conditioned on the execution of the final settlement agreement that includes the tobe-negotiated non-disparagement clause, the new GYN agreement, and the new
Spearhead agreement. [Add. B. at CJl 9.]
Following the mediation, Patterson's counsel transmitted to the Knights'
counsel a proposed settlement agreement, a proposed new GYN agreement, and a
proposed new Spearhead agreement. [0300.] The Knights rejected these three
agreements. [0343.]
Patterson filed a motion to lift the stay and enforce what he alleged to be a
binding settlement in the form of the Mediation Agreement. [0167-259.] The
Knights opposed the motion, claiming among other things that a mutually
acceptable settlement agreement, new GYN agreement, and new Spearhead

3

agreement were essential terms and without these documents, there was no final
agreement. [0361-417.]
The trial court granted Patterson's motion and concluded that the Mediation
c.rj

Agreement, standing alone, contained all of the material terms of a final settlement.
[Add. A at 0550-558.] [The trial court's order is attached as Addendum A.]

III.

RELEVANT FACTS
The Relationship Between the Parties
1.

In 2004, Jed Knight, Patterson, and Ryan Fry ("Fry")-all Nu-Skin

distributors----entered into a joint venture agreement under which they agreed to
share equally all amounts they received from their respective Nu-Skin
~

distributorships. [0391.] 2
2.

Patterson and Jed Knight bought out Fry's interest in the joint venture

agreement. Subsequently, Patterson, Jed Knight, and Alisha Knight entered into a
supplemental agreement under which Alisha Knight would also receive a portion
of the income. [0391.]

2

~

The record does not contain copies of the original agreements referenced in
Fact 1 to 4, but these agreements are addressed in the recitals of agreements
proposed by Patterson following the mediation, and the record citations are to these
references.
4

3.

In addition to their joint venture under the joint venture agreement and

supplemental agreement, Patterson and the Knights are each shareholders of a
separate business, GYN. [0391.]
4.

Since 2003, Jed Knight has earned additional compensation through

Spearhead, a Utah general partnership. [0376-77, 0391.]
5.

Patterson filed this action asserting that Jed Knight was obligated to

share with Patterson the income Jed Knight was receiving under his agreement
with Spearhead. [Add. A at 0550.]
The Mediation Agreement

6.

At the conclusion of a mediation, the parties executed the hand-

written Mediation Agreement. [Add. A at 0551.]
7.

Paragraph 1 of the Mediation Agreement indicates that commissions

received from Spearhead-a nonparty to the litigation and the mediation [0405 at en
9]-would be split 50-50 going forward, and that this would involve a new
agreement with Spearhead to replace the existing agreement that obligates
Spearhead to pay only the Knights:

[Add.Bat <JI 1.]

5

8.

Paragraph 8 makes the Mediation Agreement subject to the drafting of

a mutually acceptable settlement agreement containing the terms of the Mediation
Agreement and a non-disparagement clause; a new agreement for GYN; and the
new Spearhead agreement:

[Add. B at <J( 8.]
9.

Paragraph 9 of the Mediation Agreement makes dismissal of the

lawsuit contingent on the execution of these additional agreements.

Events Following the Mediation
10.
4i

A few days following the mediation, Patterson's counsel sent to the

Knights' counsel drafts of a final settlement agreement, a new GYN agreement,
and a new Spearhead agreement. [0300.]
11.

Counsel for Patterson sent a follow-up email inquiring about the status

of the draft agreements. Counsel for the Knights responded the same day, "[T]he
6

docs are in the hands of our clients and we are awaiting their input. [W]e will put a
~

'bug in their ear' to get with it." [0341.]
12.

A few days later, Patterson's counsel sent another email to the

Knights' counsel, who replied that that terms of the draft final settlement
agreement, new GYN agreement, and new Spearhead agreement were
unacceptable. [0343.]
13.

Patterson's counsel responded with his belief that the Mediation

Agreement "is legally binding," [0345], and proceeded to ask the trial court to
require the Knights to execute Patterson's draft agreements. [0268-71.]
14.

The trial court granted Patterson's motion, concluding that the

Mediation Agreement was a binding, enforceable, final settlement, but that the
draft final settlement agreement, new GYN agreement, and new Spearhead
agreement went beyond the materials terms of the Mediation Agreement and were
therefore not enforceable. [Add. A at 0550-58.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court should reverse the trial court's ruling that the Mediation
Agreement is a final, enforceable settlement agreement between the parties. The
Mediation Agreement expressly provides that it is subject to the future drafting and
agreement by the parties to further written contracts, including a mutually
acceptable final settlement agreement containing the terms of the Mediation

7

Agreement and a non-disparagement clause and new GYN and Spearhead
agreements; and that dismissal of the litigation is contingent on the execution of
such agreements. Where these subsequent, final written contracts were never
r.#J

agreed upon or executed, essential terms of a final settlement are lacking and the
trial court erred in concluding otherwise.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE MEDIATION AGREEMENT IS NOT A FINAL,
ENFORCEABLE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THAT RESOLVED
THE LITIGATION.
As a matter of law, the trial court erred when it concluded that the Mediation

Agreement was a final, enforceable settlement agreement containing all of the
~

material and essential terms of agreement between the parties necessary to
manifest a meeting of the minds and sufficient to end conclusively the litigation
between the parties. The express language of the Mediation Agreement makes any
final settlement "subject to" the future drafting of a mutually acceptable final
settlement agreement containing the terms of the Mediation Agreement and a nondisparagement clause and new GYN and Spearhead agreements. And dismissal of
the lawsuit is not to occur until execution of those final agreements. Under these
circumstances, essential, material terms of a final settlement are lacking as a matter
of law, and the trial court's conclusion to the contrary was incorrect.

8

A.

Whether a Final Settlement Occurred Is Based on Utah
Standards Regarding Contract Definiteness and Finality

While "[g]enerally, the trial court's summary enforcement of a settlement
agreement 'will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was an
abuse of discretion,"' the questions "[i]in arriving at its decision to enforce the
settlement agreement" of whether the parties "had a meeting of the minds" or
"whether a contract exists between parties is a question of law ... reviewed for
correctness." John Deere Co., 876 P.2d at 883 (quoting Zions First Nat 'l Bank,
781 P.2d at 479 (additional internal citation and quotation omitted)); see also

McKelvey, 2009 UT App 126 at ,I 17 (in considering trial court's ruling on motion
to enforce settlement agreement, "[ t]he existence of a contract is a question of law,
to be reviewed for correctness").
Under Utah law, "[s]ettlement agreements are governed by the rules applied
to general contract actions." Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995).
Principally in focus in this case are the standards from this Court and the Supreme
Court regarding definiteness and finality of contracts generally and settlement
agreements specifically.
It is well settled that "[a] condition precedent to the enforcement of any

contract is that there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be

9

enforced." Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427,428 (1961). 3 "[T]he
terms of the agreement must be reasonably certain so parties know what is required
of them, and definite enough that the courts can delineate the intent of the
~

contracting parties." Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Utah 1980).
Under Utah law, '"[t]he terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they
provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an
appropriate remedy."' Cea v. Hoffman, 2012 UT App 101, <J[ 24, 276 P.3d 1178
(citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 33(2)). In other words, a binding
contract does not exist unless "the terms are sufficiently definite as to be capable of
being enforced." LD III, LLC v. BBRD, LC, 2009 UT App 301, <J[ 14,221 P.3d
867.
Moreover, '""[i]f an intention is manifested in any way that legal obligations

(.j

between the parties shall be deferred until the writing is made, the preliminary
negotiations and agreements do not constitute a contract."'" 1-800 Contacts, Inc.
v. Weigner, 2005 UT App 523, <JI 7, 127 P.3d 1241 (quoting R.J. Daum Constr. Co.

3

See also Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597,600 (1962) ("A binding
contract can exist only where there has been mutual assent by the parties
manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms. Furthermore, a contract can
be enforced by the courts only if the obligations of the parties are set forth with
sufficient definiteness that it can be performed; Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575
P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978) ("[C]ontractual mutual assent requires assent by all
parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the
terms.").
10

v. Child, 122 Utah 194,247 P.2d 817,820 (1952) (quoting Restatement of
Contracts § 25 cmt. a)). 4 Stated differently, '"[s]o long as there is any uncertainty
or indefiniteness, or future negotiations or considerations to be had between the
parties, there is not a completed contract. In fact, there is no contract at all."'

Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, 'I[ 17, 94 P.3d 179 (quoting
Candland v. Oldroyd, 67 Utah 605, 248 P. 1101, 1102 (1926)) (holding that broad,
indefinite statements about compensation did not create a contract between law
firm and attorney with regard to compensation).
A contract that "leave[ s] open material terms for future consideration" is
referred to as an "agreement to agree" and is "generally unenforceable." Harmon

v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979). An agreement to agree can only be

4

The trial court correctly indicated that a "settlement agreement, like any other
contract, is enforceable even when the parties expect to put the terms in a more
formal document." [Add. A at 0553 (gathering cases).] However, the case law
relied on by the trial court for this proposition has limited application here. See
Lawrence Const. Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382, 383 (Utah 1982) (finding
existence of binding settlement agreement because documents constituting
agreement did not "specifically state[] that the settlement was contingent on"
conditions argued by contesting party); Zions First Nat'/. Bank, 781 P.2d at 480
(finding existence of binding settlement agreement based on oral agreement
entered into during settlement negotiations; however, challenging party did not
challenge any terms of oral agreement); Miller v. Basic Research, LLC, No. 2:07cv-871 TS, 2013 WL 1194721, at *6 (D. Utah Mar. 22, 2013) (finding existence of
binding settlement agreement from term sheet signed by parties after mediation;
however, party opposing agreement did not present any evidence that any material
terms required further negotiation and, in fact, informed court that settlement had
been reached and was successful).
11

enforced if it '''include[ s] sufficiently definite terms and conditions,' regarding the
'essential terms of the contract."' GeoNan Properties, LLC v. Park-Ro-She, Inc.,
2011 UT App 309, <J[ 10,263 P.3d 1169 (quoting Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch,
~

955 P.2d 357, 363 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc.,
896 P.2d 47, 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). 5 "Whether or not [a term is] essential to
the contract requires an examination of the entire agreement and the circumstances
under which the agreement was entered into." Cessna Fin. Corp., 575 P.2d at
1050.6

B.

There Could Be No Final Settlement Without Execution of
Further Written Agreements, Which Never Occurred.

The Mediation Agreement was not a final settlement agreement. Any
settlement was subject to the negotiation and execution of further agreements,
which never happened. Without the essential material terms required by
paragraphs 1, 8, and 9, the Mediation Agreement is unenforceable as a stand-alone
settlement agreement.

5

See also King v. Nevada Elec. Inv. Co., 893 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 (D. Utah
1994) ("Although it is not necessary that the contract provide for every collateral
matter or possible contingency, the parties themselves must have set forth with
sufficient definiteness at least the essentials terms of the contract.") (citing D.H.
Overmyer Co. v. Brown, 439 F.2d 926, 930 (10th Cir. 1971)).
6
See also Crismon v. Western Co. of North America, 742 P.2d 1219, 1221-22
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Determining whether the specific terms omitted were
essential to the agreement requires an examination of the entire agreement and the
circumstances under which the agreement was entered into.") (citing Cessna Fin.
Corp., 575 P.2d at 1050).
12

1.

The Spearhead Agreement Is an Essential, Missing Term of
a Final Settlement Between the Parties.

The requirement in paragraphs 1, 8, and 9 of the Mediation Agreement that a
new agreement be put in place with third-party Spearhead is an essential settlement
term without which there could be no settlement nor dismissal of the lawsuit.
Paragraph 1 specifies that it was to be in and through that new Spearhead
agreement that Spearhead itself was to split commissions 50-50 between the
parties. [Fact 7 .] Paragraph 8 expressly makes the Mediation Agreement
"[s]ubject to" the drafting of the new Spearhead agreement. [Fact 8.] And
paragraph 9 provides that no dismissal paperwork is to be filed until execution of
the new Spearhead agreement. [Fact 9.] Had the new Spearhead agreement not
been an essential, material settlement term, it would not have been required in
paragraphs, 1, 8, and 9 of the Mediation Agreement and Patterson would not have
transmitted a proposed new Spearhead agreement following the mediation.
Based on the express provisions in the Mediation Agreement regarding the
Spearhead agreement, it was error for the trial court to "conclude[] that the
material term at issue is that the parties are going to split the proceeds 50/50 going
forward," and that "whether those proceeds came directly from Spearhead through
an amended agreement or from Defendants is not the material issue." [Add. A at
553 n.3.] There is nothing in the Mediation Agreement itself to suggest that

13

Patterson merely wanted-whatever the source-a 50-50 split of commissions
arising from the original agreement between Spearhead and Jed Knight.
Instead, paragraph 1 expressly calls for a new Spearhead agreement through
~

which commissions will be directed 50-50 between the parties, and this was so
important that paragraph 8 makes the Mediation Agreement "subject to" the
drafting of the new Spearhead agreement, and paragraph 9 requires the new
Spearhead agreement to be executed before dismissal paperwork would be filed.
[Facts 7-9.] The trial court could not write these essential terms out of the
Mediation Agreement. 7

2.

The Terms of the Spearhead Agreement Are Missing and
Preclude Enforcement of the Mediation Agreement as the
Final Settlement Agreement.

While the negotiation and execution of a new Spearhead agreement is an
~

essential term without which there could be no settlement, any final settlement
agreement is lacking in definiteness because the new Spearhead agreement remains

7

Even if the Court were to construe the trial court's legal conclusion in footnote
3 of the Order (that "the material term at issue is that the parties are going to split
the proceeds 50/50 going forward-whether those proceeds came directly from
Spearhead through an amended agreement or from Defendants") as a factual
finding requiring evidence marshaling, which is not the case because it is a
conclusion of law, Patterson presented no evidence whatsoever outside of the four
comers of the Mediation Agreement from which the Court could have made such a
finding. Patterson's two declarations are silent on the issue [0347-50, 0447-51],
and acknowledge his view of the importance of a new Spearhead agreement, which
he obtained and supplied to the Knights' counsel following the mediation. [034950 at <J[ 15.]

14

subject to future negotiation among Patterson, the Knights, and Spearhead-a third
party [Fact 7]. As the Supreme Court held in Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, '"[s]o
long as there is any uncertainty or indefiniteness, or future negotiations or
considerations to be had between the parties, there is not a completed contract. In
fact, there is no contract at all."' 2004 UT 26 at <JI 17 (quoting Candland, 248 P. at
1102 (1926)). 8
The problem here is not merely the uncertainty and indefiniteness of future
negotiations between the parties of a new Spearhead agreement, but also the
uncertainty of negotiating with Spearhead, a third party. In its quick analysis that
what remained after the Mediation Agreement was simply the "formalizing" of
what is in the Mediation Agreement [Add. A at 553], the trial court ignored the

8

See also the other authorities cited in Point l(A), above. See also lnterway,
Inc. v. Alagna, 407 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (The words "subject to"
"when used in connection with contracts ... usually indicate a condition on a
party's duty of performance and suggest that mere negotiation is contemplated by
the parties."); Ocean Atl. Dev. Corp. v. Aurora Christian Sch., Inc., 322 F.3d 983,
995-96 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[A] letter of intent or similar preliminary writing that
reflects a tentative agreement contingent upon successful completion of
negotiations that are ongoing, does not amount to a contract that binds the
parties."); Evergreen Investments, LLC v. FCL Graphics, Inc., 334 F.3d 750, 75457 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that letter of intent did not constitute binding
agreement because it "was 'subject to' several factors and conditions including ...
negotiation and execution of definitive legal documentations ... as well as 'certain
legal, regulatory and other necessary third party approvals"'); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. AIG Annuity Ins. Co., 270 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) ("The
words 'subject to' are unambiguous and indicate a condition when used in a
contract.").
15

reality of having to put in place a new Spearhead agreement among Patterson, the
Knights, and Spearhead. This was error.
As illustrated by the new proposed Spearhead agreement transmitted after
the mediation, the task at hand was not as simple as formalizing the single term of
the new Spearhead agreement referenced in the Mediation Agreement. To the
contrary, the proposed new Spearhead agreement is 14 pages long, involves unique
contractual terms specific to entities in a multi-level marketing company, and
contains language not found in the original Spearhead agreement or the Mediation
Agreement. [0221-34.] Where the original Spearhead agreement only involved
Jed Knight and Spearhead [0221-22], the new proposed agreement adds as parties
Alisha Knight, GYN, and Patterson [0221]. The new agreement would obligate
Alisha Knight, for example, to nondisclosure, noncompetition, and non-solicitation
(j

covenants and other terms to which she was not subject before. [0226-29.]
The trial court correctly refused to enforce Patterson's proposed new
Spearhead agreement, concluding that it "go[ es] beyond the material terms of the
Agreement executed by the parties at the mediation and there is no evidence that
Defendants agreed to the additional terms." [Add. A at 0557.] However, the trial
court failed to go on to explain what the Mediation Agreement could possibly
mean when it states that it is subject to the negotiation of a new Spearhead
agreement and that dismissal of the case was conditioned on execution of the new

16

Spearhead agreement. Questions remain as to what the new Spearhead agreement
will need to say and what is to happen if the parties and Spearhead are unable to
reach an agreement. As a matter of Utah law, these uncertainties preclude
enforcement of the Mediation Agreement as the final settlement between the
parties.

3.

A MutuallvAcceptable Settlement Agreement with a Nondisparagement Provision ls an Essential. Missing Term of
Final Settlement

For similar reasons as the new Spearhead agreement, it was an essential term
of final settlement that a "mutually acceptable settlement agreement" containing
the terms of the Mediation Agreement and a non-disparagement clause be executed
and that dismissal papers were not to be filed until the mutually acceptable
settlement agreement was executed. [Facts 8-9.] While the settlement agreement
was to include the provisions contained in the Mediation Agreement, paragraph 8
also makes an essential part of settlement a mutual non-disparagement clause, but
fails to specify the parameters of this clause.
Courts in Utah find contract terms "essential" by examining "the entire
agreement and the circumstances under which the agreement was entered into,"

Cessna Fin. Corp., 57 5 P.2d at I 050,9 including essential terms of settlement

9

See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231,236 (Utah 1985)
(recognizing exclusionary terms as essential terms of insurance contract); Davies v.
Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing price as essential term
17

agreements. 10 While no Utah court has addressed whether a non-disparagement
clause is an essential term of a settlement agreement, the Seventh Circuit addressed
this issue in Higbee v. Sentry Insurance Co., 253 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2001), where
~

parties in an employment case agreed in principle after a mediation to certain
terms, such as including a non-disparagement clause. Id. at 996. There, the nondisparagement clause was an essential settlement term because the employee
"made it clear that she would not settle the case without such a clause." Id. at
998. This case is no different because the non-disparagement clause is specifically
identified in the Mediation Agreement as one of the terms to which settlement
would be subject. [Fact 8.]
While the non-disparagement clause is an essential term of the Mediation
Agreement, the specific details of the clause are not sufficiently definite and

:s

certain. The same was true in Higbee, where the Seventh Circuit reversed a trial
court's finding of a binding settlement agreement because an essential non-

of construction contract); Brown's Shoe Fit Co., 955 P.2d at 364 ("The initial
period included all the essential elements of a lease: the identity of the Property,
the agreed term, and the rental amount."); Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. St. George
City, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376-77 (Utah 1995) (recognizing price and quantity of
construction were material terms in construction contract).
10
See, e.g., Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah 1985)
(finding that note in letter confirming settlement agreement regarding appointment
of guardian was not condition to completion of settlement agreement); Sackler,
897 P.2d at 1222 (finding that parties did not proceed beyond preliminary
negotiations of settlement agreement because they did not reach meeting of minds
on essential term-full rental rate of property that parties were going to rent out).
18

disparagement clause was not sufficiently definite. See 253 F.3d at 998. This was
because "the parties agreed on little more than the fact that the settlement
agreement would contain ... a nondisparagement clause, and further negotiation
was necessary to come to a specific agreement." Id.
Like the draft settlement agreement in Higbee, the non-disparagement clause
is not spelled out with any specificity in the Mediation Agreement, rendering the
Mediation Agreement, standing alone, as not sufficiently certain and definite.
There is no way from the mere statement that the final settlement agreement is to
include "mutual non-disparagement" to find "a basis for determining the existence
of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy." Cea, 2012 UT App 101 at CJ[ 24
(citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 33(2)). Indeed, the terms of the nondisparagement clause are not "reasonably certain so the parties know what is
required of them, and definite enough that the courts can delineate the intent of the
contracting parties." Reed, 610 P.2d at 1377. Instead, the parties are ignorant to
exactly what they can and cannot do or say. On this ground, it was error to
conclude that the Mediation Agreement, standing alone, was a final settlement
agreement.

4.

The GYN Agreement ls an Essential, Missing Term ofa
Final Settlement Between the Parties.

Finally, on similar grounds as the new Spearhead agreement and a mutually
acceptable settlement agreement, the negotiation, creation, and execution of a new
19

"GYN agreement" was an essential term of any final settlement, as specified in
paragraph 8 and 9 of the Mediation Agreement. [Facts 8-9.] The fact that the
parties never agreed to a new GYN agreement precludes enforcement of the
41

Mediation Agreement as the final settlement between the parties. On this ground
and the others identified above, the district court erred in concluding that the
Mediation Agreement is a binding, enforceable settlement between the parties.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Knights respectfully request that the Court
reverse the trial court's legal conclusion that the Mediation Agreement-standing
alone--was a binding and enforceable settlement agreement, and in turn reverse
~

the Court's ruling dismissing this action with prejudice, and remand the case for
further proceedings.

20
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TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

CHARLEY PATTERSON, an individual,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
Case No. 140906572
JED KNIGHT, an individual, and ALISHA
KNIGHT, an individual,
Judge James D. Gardner
Defendants.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Lift Stipulated Stay and to
Enforce Settlement (Motion). 1 The parties briefed the Motion and the Court held a hearing on
July 7, 2015. The parties filed supplemental briefing on August 11, 2015. Having carefully
~

reviewed the record and considering the arguments of counsel, the Court now issues the
following Order.
By way of background, this dispute centers around a joint venture agreement between the
parties whereby they agreed to combine their Nu Skin distributorships and share equally
(Plaintiff 50% and Defendants 50%) all amounts they received with respect to the distribution of
Nu Skin products. In or around September 2014, Plaintiff sued Defendants based on Plaintiff's
claim that Plaintiff was entitled to a portion of the commissions Defendants had been receiving
related to the distribution of the Nu Skin products from a company called Spearhead, Inc.

1

Defendants do not contest Plaintiff's request to lift the stay.
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(Spearhead). In January 2015, the parties jointly moved to stay this action to attend early
mediation. On February 4, 2015, the parties attended mediation with retired Judge Frank G.
Noel. At the conclusion of the mediation, the parties signed a hand-written agreement
(Agreement). There is no dispute that the Agreement was signed by all the parties. The
Agreement contains nine provisions, including key provisions that the parties would split the
Spearhead commissions 50/50 going forward and that Defendants would pay Plaintiff $125,000
for past commissions. The Agreement specified payment terms and other material details,
including a provision contemplating the drafting of a more formal "mutually acceptable
settlement agreement," as well as a new joint venture agreement and a new agreement with
Spearhead to reflect the issues set forth in the Agreement. Following the mediation, on or about
February 12, 2015, Plaintiff's counsel transmitted to Defendants' counsel a draft of a more
fonnal settlement agreement, as contemplated by the Agreement. On or about February 18, 2015,
Plaintiff's counsel sent Defendants' counsel a follow-up email asking for a status on the review
of the documents. Defendants' counsel responded: ''the docs are in the hands of our clients and
we are awaiting their input. [W]e will put a 'bug in their ear' to get with it." On March 2, 2015,
Plaintiff's counsel sent another follow-up email, and this time Defendants' counsel responded
that they would not be signing the formal agreements and that they were ''terminating the
mediation proposed agreement." Plaintiff's counsel responded that same day indicating their
belief that the Agreement "reached by the parties during mediation is legally binding."
Plaintiff argues in his Motion that not only is the Agreement signed at mediation binding,
but that this Court should enforce the more formal agreements circulated on February 12, 2015.
Defendants argue that the Agreement signed at mediation is not enforceable because (1) it is only
2
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~

an agreement-to-agree, (2) it lacks definite material terms, and (3) the parties intended that the
settlement agreement was not a final expression of their settlement or that Mr. Knight lacked the
mental capacity to sign the Agreement. The Court concludes that the Agreement is an
enforceable and binding agreement that should be enforced.
Utah law favors voluntary settlement of legal disputes. Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v.

~

Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979) ("Settlements are favored in the law, and should be
encouraged, because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to the parties, but also to the
judicial system."). Utah courts have recognized that settlement agreements should be enforced
when the "record establishes a binding agreement and the excuse for nonperfonnance is
comparatively unsubstantial." Zions First Nat. Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d
478, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "The basic rules of contract formation are used to detennine
whether two parties have entered into an enforceable settlement agreement." McKelvey v.

Hamilton, 2009 UT App. 126,128, 211 P.3d 390 (citing Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Sys.,
Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584-85 (Utah Ct.App.1993). "Contract formation requires two necessary
elements: offer and acceptance." McKelvey, 2009 UT App. 126, ,I 28 (citing 1-800 Contacts, Inc.

v. Weigner, 2005 UT App 523, ,I 2, 127 P.3d 1241).2 Both of those elements are met in this case.
At the conclusion of a lengthy mediation, the parties reached a meeting of the minds on the

2

"An offer is a manifestation of willingness to enter into an agreement, inviting another to accept An
acceptance is a manifestation of assent to an offer, such that an objective, reasonable person is justified in
understanding that a fully enforceable contract has been made. An acceptance must unconditionally assent
to all material tenns presented in the offer ... or it is a rejection ...." McKelvey, 2009 UT App. 126, ,I 28
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
3
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essential terms of an agreement, it was put into writing, reviewed by the parties and their
counsel, and it was signed.
Although Defendants do not dispute that they negotiated and signed the Agreement, they
do dispute that it was a final settlement. First, Defendants argue that the Agreement is only an
agreement-to-agreement because it "requires future agreements and future negotiations." (Def.
Opp. Memo. 4.) Specifically, Defendants point out that the Agreement states as follows:
"Subject to Drafting mutually acceptable Settlement Agreement [with the] above provisions and
mutual non-disparagement, and new GYN & Spearhead Agreements." This provision, however,
does not contemplate further negotiations over material terms, but instead contemplates (1) that
the parties will take the handwritten Agreement and formalize it in a written format; and (2)
parties will amend existing agreements to include the provisions set forth in the Agreement. 3 In
other words, the material terms are set forth in the Agreement and formalizing them in a written
document and/or amending other existing documents to include the provisions of the Agreement
does not make the Agreement an agreement-to-agree. Utah law provides that a settlement
agreement, like any other contract, is enforceable even when the parties expect to put the terms
in a more formal document. See Lawrence Const. Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah
1982), Zions First Nat. Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 480 (Utah Ct. App.
3

Defendants argue that the Agreement is contingent on an agreement with a third-party, Spearhead, and
therefore cannot be enforceable. Plaintiff argues that the parties anticipated that the Spearhead agreement
would be amended to include the new division of the proceeds. Furthermore, Plaintiff claims that
Spearhead actually agreed to the amendment after the mediation. Regardless, the Court concludes that the
material term at issue is that the parties are going to split the proceeds 50/50 going forward-whether
those proceeds came directly from Spearhead through an amended agreement or from Defendants is not
the material issue.
4
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1989); Miller v. Basic Research, LLC, No. 2:07-CV-871 TS, 2013 WL 1194721, at *2 (D. Utah
Mar. 22, 2013) appeal dismissed, 750 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2014). In fact, this is common place
in settlements that talce place at mediation.
Defendants next argue that the Agreement is not binding because it lacks definite
material tenns to show a meeting of the minds. The Court also rejects this argument. Although

~

the Agreement is handwritten and the parties did anticipate a more formal written agreement
adopting the agreed upon material tenns, the Agreement does set forth the essential tenns of the
parties' agreement and current intent to settle the lawsuit. It sets forth the amounts Defendants
would pay to Plaintiff to resolve his claims and the manner in which such amounts would be
paid. It provides that Spearhead commissions would be split between Plaintiff and the
Defendants with a 50/50 split beginning with the January 2015 commissions,4 and made clear
that commissions received from current Got Your Number, Inc. downlines would also be split
50/50. It sets out the parties' responsibilities with respect to maintaining their downlines and the
consequences if they are not maintained. Further, it specifies how business expenses would be
handled going forward It also provides for the drafting and execution of a more fonnal
settlement document and the dismissal of the underlying lawsuit with prejudice. When the parties
left mediation on February 4, 2015, they had agreed to the material terms of a settlement
agreement and the terms are sufficiently definite to be enforced.

4

Defendants argue that there is nothing in the Agreement as to how the Defendants would split their 50%
share of the commissions. This, however, is between the Defendants and does not preclude the Plaintiff
from settling his dispute with the Defendants simply because they Defendants may have their own
dispute.
5
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Next, Defendants contend that Mr. Knight was told by the other parties that it was not a
final agreement at the mediation and that he lacked capacity to sign the Agreement because he
was ill and it was a long mediation. Specifically, in a declaration filed with the Court, Mr. Knight
claims that Plaintiff and co-defendant Ms. Knight told him the Agreement was not binding, but
rather "merely a starting point for negotiations." (Deel. of Jed Knight, ,nf 13 - 17.) In addition,

Mr. Knight's declaration also states that he was sick and he "did not have the presence of mind,
emotionally or physically, to understand what the written proposal contained." (Id

1 17.) The

Court rejects these arguments.
The Utah Uniform Mediation Act (Act) expressly provides that unless waived or
precluded, "a mediation communication is privileged . . . and is not subject to discovery or
admissible in evidence." Utah Code § 78B-10-104(1). 5 An exception to this general rule is that
the privilege is not applicable to "an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the
agreement." Id at 106(l)(a). In trying to portray the Agreement as unenforceable or an
agreement-to-agree, the Defendants have submitted declarations that contain the very type of
statements that would be privileged under the Act. While the Defendants seek to invoke a narrow
exception under the Act under Utah Code § 78B-10-106(2), the Court concludes that exception
does not apply in this matter as the proposed evidence does not substantially outweigh the
interest in protecting the confidentiality because the proposed evidence is not credible or does
not raise substantial doubt whether a binding agreement was entered into at the mediation. Even

if the Court were to find the exception to the Act applied and considered the Defendants'
5

The Act defines "mediation communication" as "conduct or a statement, whether oral, in a record,
verbal, or nonverbal, that occurs during mediation ..." Utah Code § 78B-l 0-102(2).
6
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declarations, the Court would still conclude that the Agreement is binding. Tellingly, no
statements about the Agreement being "not binding" or a "starting point" are included in the
Agreement itself. Furthermore, the parties were represented by able and competent counsel at the
mediation and, yet, the Agreement contains no mention of it not being binding. The language of
the Agreement combined with the representation by all parties of sophisticated counsel undercuts

~

Defendants' argument that the parties intended the Agreement to be a "starting point."6 Thus,
regardless of the whether the privilege under the Act precludes the Court from considering the
Defendants' declarations or if the Court does consider the Defendants' declarations, the result is
the same: the Court concludes that the Agreement is binding.
As to Mr. Knight's post-mediation claim that he lacked the requisite mental capacity to

~

sign the Agreement, Mr. Knight has failed to meet his burden to support his argument. Under
Utah law, the party claiming incapacity to contract must show that his "mental facilities [were]
so deficient or impaired that there was not sufficient power to comprehend the subject of the
contract, its nature and its probable consequences, and to act with discretion in relation thereto,
or with relation to the ordinary affairs of life." Walker v. U.S. Gen., Inc., 916 P.2d 903, 907
(Utah 1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Mr. Knight's statements that he lacked
6

"The conduct of both parties may also be considered in determining whether they entered into an
agreement." McKelvey, 2009 UT App 126,128,211 P.3d 390. In this case, signing the written
Agreement that contains no language that it was a "starting point" or "not binding" evidences the
Defendants' intent. Conduct by the Plaintiff's lawyer and the Defendants' lawyer after the mediation also
supports that parties had entered into a binding agreement. After the mediation concluded, Plaintiff's
counsel sent Defendants' counsel a draft of the formal agreements, communicated about the proposed
formal agreements in a couple of separate emails, and not until a couple weeks later did Defendants'
counsel raise any objection. At no point in the initial communications did either party act as if they had
not settled this matter at the mediation.
7
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capacity do not meet this standard, particularly where he was represented by counsel and where
an independent mediator was involved.
Finally, while the Court finds the Agreement to be enforceable, the Court does not go as
far as Plaintiff requests and the Court will not summarily enforce the more formal agreements
circulated on February 12, 2015. While the Agreement does contemplate a more formal
settlement agreement, the formal agreements circulated by Plaintiff on February 12, 2015 go
beyond the material terms of the Agreement executed by the parties at the mediation and there is
no evidence that Defendants agreed to the additional terms. The Court rules only that the
Agreement is enforceable and operates to settle the pending litigation. To the extent the parties
would like to include other terms in the more formal agreement, they are certainly free to do so
provided that they agree on the additional terms.
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Lift Stipulated Stay and to Enforce Settlement is
GRANTED. The Court lifts the stay imposed in this case, detennines that the Agreement is
enforceable and dismisses this matter with prejudice. This is the final order of the Court and no
further order is necessary.
DATED this may of September, 2015.

BY THE COURT:
James D. Gardner

DISTRICT JUDG
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